In 2003, Shen et al. proposed an improvement on YangShieh's timestamp-based password authentication scheme using smart cards. Then they claimed that their scheme cannot withstand a forged login attack, but also eliminate a problem of Yang-Shieh's. However, their scheme is still susceptible to forged login attack. In this letter, we show how the forged login attack can be worked out on Shen et al.'s scheme.
Introduction
In 1999, Yang and Shieh [1] proposed a timestamp-based password authentication scheme using a smart card to achieve user authentication and arbitrarily change a password. In addition, the remote server does not need to store the passwords or verification tables for authentication the users. Subsequently, Chan and Cheng [2] pointed out that Yang and Shieh's scheme was vulnerable to a forged login attack, in which an intruder could impersonate legitimate users to login and accesses the remote server. In 2002, Fan et al. [3] also showed that Yang-Shieh scheme could not withstand the forged login attack and proposed a slight modification to eliminate the security flaws.
Thereafter, in 2003, Shen et al. [5] pointed out that Fan et al.'s solution are inefficient and impractical because it limits the user identity ID i with a strict form and proposed an improved scheme that could withstand the forged login attack and also provide mutual authentication to withstand the forged server attack.
Yet, Shen et al.'s improved scheme is still susceptible to forged login attack that developed by Sun et al. in [4] and Chen in [6] , respectively. Accordingly, the current letter demonstrates that how the forged login attack can be worked out on their scheme.
Review of the Shen et al.'s Scheme
Shen et al's timestamp-based password authentication scheme is composed of three phases; registration, login and authentication. 
U i
Server Figure 1 shows the registration phase of Shen et al.'s scheme. A new user U i wants to register with a key information center (KIC) for accessing services. The KIC then performs the following steps:
Registration Phase
1. User U i securely submits his identity ID i and a password PW i to the KIC for registration. 2. Two large prime numbers p and q are generated, and let n = p · q. 3. A prime number e is chosen at random as his public key, where e is relatively prime to (p − 1)(q − 1). 4. An integer d as a corresponding secret key that satisfies e · d ≡ 1(mod(p − 1)(q − 1)). 5. An integer g, which is a primitive element in both d and GF(q) is found, where g is KIC's public information.
where ⊕ stands for an exclusive operation. 9. Write n, e, g, ID i , CID i , S i , h i , f (·) into the smart card of U i , and issue it through a secure channel. Figure 2 shows the login and authentication phase of Shen et al.'s scheme. U i must insert his smart card into the login device when he wants to login to the remote server. The smart card will perform the following operations after U i keys in his identity ID i and password PW i .
Login Phase
1. Generate a random number r i and compute X i and Y i as follows. Here T C is the current date and time on the login device and f (x, y) is a one-way function.
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U i Server
X i = g r i ·PW i mod n Y i = S i · h r i · f (CID i ,T C ) i mod n M = {ID i , CID i , X i , Y i , n, e, g, T C } M − −−−−−−→ Check ID i , T C CID i = f (ID i ⊕ d) CID i ? = CID i (Y i ) e ? = ID i · X f (CID i ,T C ) i mod n R = ( f (CID i , T S )) d mod n Check T S {R, T S } ← −−−−−−− − R = (R) e = f (CID i , T S ) R ? = f (CID i , T S )
Send a message
remote server as a login request message.
Authentication Phase
After receiving the login request message M from U i , the remote server will perform the following operations to identify the login user: where
mod n. If it holds, then the remote server accepts the user's login request and access.
Computes
d mod n for mutual authentication, where T S is the timestamp showing the current date and time from the remote server. It returns M = {R, T S } to the user U i .
Upon receiving the message M from the remote server, the user U i verifies the message as follows:
6. Check the time interval between T S and T C , where T C is the date and time when the remote server receives the message M . If (T C − T S ) ≥ ∆T , then U i rejects the remote server, where ∆T denotes the predetermined legitimate time interval of transmission delay.
7. Calculate R using R = R e mod n = ( f (CID i , T S ) d ) e = f (CID i , T S ). If R = f (CID i , T S ) does not hold, U i then rejects the remote server and breaks the connection.
timestamp-based password authentication scheme is vulnerable to a forged login attack, which any intruder can pretend to be a valid user and login the remote server successfully.
